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113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS
Shyamkrishna Balganesh†
Should copyright infringement claims be treated as marketable assets?
Copyright law has long emphasized the free and independent alienability of
its exclusive rights. Yet, the right to sue for infringement—that copyright law
simultaneously grants authors in order to render its exclusive rights
operational—has never been thought of as independently assignable, or
indeed as the target of investments by third parties. As a result, discussions
of copyright law and policy rarely ever consider the possibility of an
acquisition or investment market emerging for actionable copyright claims,
and the advantages that such a market might hold for copyright’s goals,
objectives and functioning. This Essay analyzes the opportunities and
challenges presented by an independent market for copyright claims, and
argues that copyright law, policy, and practice would stand to benefit from
the regulated involvement of third parties in acquiring, financing, bringing,
and defending infringement claims.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of third parties acquiring, financing, or investing in
private litigation has begun to see a sharp increase in the last few years.1 Large
commercial disputes, previously thought to be immune to any third party
involvement, are today the principal targets for such involvement. In the
process, rather robust claim markets have begun to emerge in various
substantive areas.2 Despite this general trend though, the copyright system
remains resistant to the role of third parties in acquiring and bringing
infringement claims. The perceived one-sidedness of the system, which favors
large commercial enterprises at the cost of individual user-defendants, and the
general tendency among defendants to avoid litigating the question of fair use
are together thought to render copyright litigation something of an evil that
ought to be avoided unless absolutely necessary.3 Allowing third parties to
bring claims independently is, in this climate, seen as anathema. Copyright law
thus contains stringent rules of standing that courts all too readily invoke and
extend, in order to keep third parties out of the system.4
This tendency to view copyright litigation as an active hindrance that
needs to be curbed has only been exacerbated by the recent public outcry
against “copyright trolls”, which are seen as entities that seek to profit from
litigation by monetizing it.5 While the disquiet originated in the palpably
problematic context of entities that merely sought to take advantage of

1

See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1268, 1275-86 (2011); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of
American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 577 (2010); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A
Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 90 (2010).
2
See Steinitz, supra note __, at 1277.
3
For an analysis of how this affects the behavior of litigants, see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable
Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1909-24 (2007) (describing practices that
participants—primarily potential defendants—adopt in order to avoid costly copyright litigation).
4
The rigidity originates in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silvers v. Sony Pictures, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th
Cir. 2005). See also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.02 (2012).
5
See, e.g., Copyright Trolls, EFF.ORG, https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited May 28,
2012); Parker Higgins, Trouble in Trolltown: Judges Increasingly Catch On to Copyright Trolls’ Unfair
Tactics, EFF.ORG, Apr. 14, 2012, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/trouble-trolltown; Who Are
Copyright Trolls?, FIGHT COPYRIGHT TROLLS, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/about/ (last visited May 29,
2012); Mike Masnick, Rapidshare Countersues Perfect 10 For Being A 'Copyright Troll' Who Only
'Shakes
Down'
Others,
TECHDIRT,
June
14,
2010,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100614/0105019802.shtml.
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copyright’s statutory damages regime,6 it has since extended to just about any
effort to profit from copyright litigation, regardless of the legitimacy or
otherwise of the underlying claim itself. Copyright litigation is thus seen as
deserving of avoidance, and third parties’ involvement therein is in turn
viewed as doubly problematic and actively frowned upon.
In this Essay, I argue that this approach is at once both myopic and
counter-productive. Courts, scholars, and policy-makers have for far too long
believed that meaningful reform in the copyright system needs to occur
through copyright doctrine, be it at the legislative level or through judicial
interpretation.7 In the process, they have ignored the possibility that market
forces, if regulated and channeled appropriately, could do just as well and in
certain respects perhaps even better than traditional law reform efforts. This is
precisely what a regulated market for actionable copyright claims promises to
do for copyright law. And contrary to popular belief, the increased
involvement of third parties in the copyright system will inure to the benefit of
both plaintiffs and defendants in copyright infringement actions.
Copyright litigation today exhibits obvious malaises that litigation
funding is well placed to correct. Litigating a copyright claim is no longer an
affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and creators. As of 2011, the
average cost of litigating a copyright infringement case through trial, for either
plaintiff or defendant—and excluding judgment and awards—was estimated to
range from $384,000 to a staggering $2 million.8 To individual, small business,
or non-commercial creators, all of who are intended beneficiaries of copyright,
copyright litigation remains an unaffordable proposition. On the defendant
side, users and copiers of creative works are for identical reasons, all too
reluctant to defend themselves in court when threatened with an infringement
lawsuit, and go to extreme lengths to avoid the risk of being sued, even when
their actions are fully defensible under copyright’s fair use doctrine.9 Needless
licenses, clearances, and permissions—which are expensive, but cost less than
litigation—are today the norm among users and copiers, even when wholly
unnecessary as a legal matter, and motivated entirely by the impulse to avoid
costly litigation.
The costs of copyright litigation thus have a distortionary effect on
copyright law and policy. On the one hand, these costs hinder the system’s
6

See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2013).
7
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 53-55 (2010) (noting that reform
will have to come through the legislative process even though Congress is unlikely to undertake such
reform efforts in the near future).
8
AMER. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASSOC’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2012).
9
See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE (2011); James Gibson, Risk Aversion
and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-906 (2007).
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purported ability to function as an incentive for creativity.10 If creators and
authors recognize that enforcing their copyright claims in court is an
unworkable prospect (i.e., for cost reasons), copyright law’s ability to induce
creative expression begins to automatically diminish. Simultaneously, the costs
also render copyright law’s safety valves—such as the fair use doctrine, and
other limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights—meaningless, with
defendants rarely ever invoking them (given their dependence on a judicial
determination), but instead actively undermining them through their litigationavoidance strategies.11
Allowing third parties to enter copyright litigation, and acquire, fund,
or insure infringement claims—in a regulated manner—presents copyright law
with a plausible a solution. Their entry is likely to lower the cost of litigation
for participants in the system, even if not in the abstract, in the process
allowing both creators and users to focus more directly on their production and
use of creative expression. In addition, their entry will also produce a host of
indirect benefits for the copyright system, as seen and predicted in other
substantive areas where their participation is permitted. Indeed, third party
funding (and acquisition) of litigation claims has begun to gain prominence in
jurisdictions around the world, principally because practice is believed to
benefit litigants’ access to justice via courts—an expensive proposition—
without at the same time overwhelming the court system.12
In this Essay, I show how copyright law, practice, and theory would all
stand to benefit from allowing third parties to fund infringement claims and
defenses through diverse mechanisms and devices. Part I sets out the emerging
practice of allowing third parties to acquire, fund, or invest in private legal
claims and shows how the practice is altogether absent in copyright litigation.
Part II makes the theoretical case for more third party involvement in copyright
litigation. It analyzes how the copyright system embodies certain features that
make it a viable target for claim markets, and shows how copyright law,
practice, and policy are likely to benefit through the greater involvement of
third party funding in copyright litigation. Part III then examines the possible
mechanics of a market for copyright claims, and the forms in which third
parties can be involved. It then details the obstacles that exist under current law
and policy to the emergence of such a market, and changes that will need to be
made to induce the greater participation of third parties in copyright litigation.
I. THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND ITS ABSENCE
IN COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
10

For an overview of copyright’s dominant incentives rationale see Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (2009).
11
See Gibson, supra note __, at 888-906.
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The practice of third parties involving themselves in private litigation—
also known as litigation funding—has seen a sharp increase in the law few
years.13 The industry is still in its early stages in the U.S., but is predicted to
grow rapidly in the next few years as courts, state legislatures, and local bar
associations begin to relax the several restrictions that surround the practice.14
Litigation funding, broadly speaking, refers to the practice of
“providing money to a party to pursue a potential or filed lawsuit.15” Put
simply, “it is the provision of funds by companies who have no other
connection with the litigation” other than in its outcome.16 Such funding can be
on either the plaintiff or defendant side. In the former, it allows claims to be
brought in court by providing in the necessary capital, and in the latter, it
enables defendants to defend against claims without having to settle earlier
than necessary for lack of funds, or owing to the uncertainty of litigation.17
Recent estimates put the U.S. market for litigation funding at about $1 billion,
and most predict that it is likely to grow rapidly in the next few years.18
As a practice through, litigation funding is hardly new to the U.S. Since
at least the 1990s, lawyers and law firms provided clients, who needed to bring
expensive lawsuits with loans, often at extremely high interest rates.19 Their
focus was on individual plaintiffs bringing personal injury claims. Whereas
these early practices were on a small scale, and largely ad hoc, the last few
years have seen the entry of large investment firms into the practice.20 In
addition to having significantly larger amounts of capital, these new entrants
choose to invest in large commercial litigation (rather than personal injury
13

See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=print (describing
this trend); Steinitz, supra note __, at 1275.
14
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, supra note __, at 2; Appelbaum, supra note __.
15
Nat’l Ass’n of Mutual Insurance Providers, Third Party Litigation Funding: Tipping the Scales of
Justice
for
Profit,
NAMIC
Issue
Analysis
Paper,
May
2011,
http://www.namic.org/pdf/publicpolicy/1106_thirdPartyLitigation.pdf, at 1.
16
Steinitz, supra note __, at 1276.
17
Id.
18
U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD PARTY
LITIGATION
FUNDING
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (“Third-party
litigation financing is a growing phenomenon in the United States.”); Appelbaum, supra note __ (“Total
investments in lawsuits at any given time now exceed $1 billion, several industry participants
estimated.”).
19
N.Y.C. Bar, Formal Op. 2011-02: Third-Party Litigation Financing, June 2011,
http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02 (“Third
party litigation financing first emerged as an industry in the United States in the early 1990s, when a
handful of small lenders began providing cash advances to plaintiffs involved in contingency fee
litigation.”); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should
be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 55 (2004).
20
See Steinitz, supra note __, at 1277.
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claims), involving corporate entities—either as plaintiff or defendant. The “the
number and types of lawsuits financed” and indeed the “financing provided”
have grown dramatically,21 causing some scholars to refer to this as the
“second-wave” of litigation funding in the U.S.22
The impetus for this growth is often attributed to two reasons:
international competitive pressures, and the rising cost of litigation. Other
common law jurisdictions—mostly notably the U.K. and Australia—have
come to actively encourage the practice, and put in place a host of regulations
to allow claim markets to develop and grow there. In Australia, the practice
was formally approved in 2006 by the High Court.23 U.K. courts soon followed
suit, and in 2011 the U.K. adopted a Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders,
to govern and regulate the practice.24 The exponential rise of civil litigation
costs is well-known in the U.S.25 A recent estimate puts the cost of bringing a
civil claim in federal court at $15,000 and cost of defending a claim to $20,000
with both rising to well over $100,000 depending on subject matter.26
Broadly speaking, third party litigation funding works in three possible
ways: (i) through claim acquisition, (ii) through investment in the litigation,
and (iii) as “after the event” insurance.27 In a claim acquisition, the third party
purchases the actionable claim directly from the plaintiff either in whole or in
part.28 In a wide variety of subject areas, a complete acquisition confers
standing to sue on the acquirer, allowing it to dictate the litigation and
settlement strategy unilaterally.29 In a litigation investment, the third party
funds (i.e., invests in) a litigation by fronting capital to the plaintiff for
litigation and related expenses, in return for a percentage of any eventual
recovery through judgment or settlement.30 Here, the plaintiff remains in the
picture and litigates in its own name, but the parties usually enter into complex
21

N.Y.C. Bar, supra note __.
Steinitz, supra note __, at 1277. See also Holly E. Loiseau, Eric C. Lyttle, and Brianna N. Benfield,
Third-Party Financing of Commercial Litigation, ABA IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2009, at 1;
id..
23
Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd, (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.).
24
See ASSOC’N OF LITIGATION FUNDERS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LITIGATION
FUNDERS (2011), available at http://www.calunius.com/media/2540/alf%20code%20of%20practice.pdf.
25
See generally Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765 (2010).
26
Id. at 770 (quoting a study conducted by the authors for the Federal Judicial Center).
27
For a fuller elaboration of these alternatives as they apply to copyright law, see infra Part III.
28
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, supra note __, at 11.
29
See Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2531 (2008) (holding that
assignees of legal claims have standing under federal law to commence actions).
30
N.Y.C. Bar, supra note __ (“If the claim appears meritorious, the financing company will advance
amounts to cover attorneys fees and the other costs of the litigation…[and these] advances typically are
made to the claimant or its outside litigation counsel, in return for a percentage of any eventual
recovery.”).
22

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS

7

arrangements to determine who controls the litigation.31 The third form of
funding operates on the defendant’s side, and involves a third party purchasing
a defendant’s litigation risk after a claim has been commenced. In effect this
operates as a form of insurance, after an event has occurred, but where the
magnitude of risk remains uncertain—hence its description as a form of “after
the event insurance”.32 This form of funding is less common in the U.S. than
the other two, especially since U.S. law doesn't allow fee-shifting by prevailing
defendants, along the lines of U.K. law.33 Each of these forms of third party
funding carries over rather well to the unique circumstances of copyright
litigation, which is discussed in greater detail later.
All three forms of funding facilitate the creation of “claim markets,” as
the term is used here. While technically, it is only in a claim acquisition that
the third party takes a formal ownership stake in the claim, the litigation
investment and insurance too involve transferring the risk of litigation—either
in part or in full—to the third party. While the third party many not obtain a
formal ownership stake, it nonetheless alienates the risk that litigating the
claim entails through a market mechanism.
Despite all of these trends, copyright litigation has remained by and
large immune to third party involvement. Copyright litigation costs well over
three times the already-high average cost of litigation.34 And yet, market-based
solutions to the problem of copyright’s litigation costs have been somewhat
rare. Unlike in the patent context, where non-performing entities (NPEs) are
known acquire patents pre-emptively and then sue for infringement,35
copyright trades rarely ever occur in active anticipation of future litigation.36
Contingency-fee based arrangements in copyright litigation too are very rare.37
So too are collective enforcement mechanisms, where individual rights-holders
31

Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 38-40).
32
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 380 (2009).
33
See Philip S. Figa, The “American Rule” Has Outlived its Usefulness: Adopt the “English Rule”,
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13.
34
See AIPLA, supra note 11.
35
See generally Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012).
36
It is sometimes mistakenly believed that patent infringement claims can be transferred and assigned
independent of the patent itself. See RAND Institute for Civil Justice, supra note __, at 12 (“Patent claims
are transferable under federal law.”). This is incorrect. Patent infringement claims, such as those for past
infringement can be transferred only when accompanied by a transfer/assignment of the patent itself. See
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 43 (1923); 8 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS §21.03[g][i] (2011) (“The damage claim cannot be transferred as such apart from
the patent.”); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1344 (2000) (noting how such a transfer “must be accompanied by
an assignment of the underlying patent”). The rules of patent law are in this respect, strikingly similar, to
those of copyright law. See infra Part IV.A.
37
Copyright Office, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Notice of Inquiry, 76 FED. REG. 66,758,
66759 (2011).
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band together to collectively monitor and enforce their rights, thereby crosssubsidizing their litigation costs.38
II. THE BENEFITS OF A MARKET FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
Having seen how litigation funding operates, and its failure—thus far—
to influence copyright litigation, this Part moves to examining what the
copyright system stands to gain through such funding, which effectively would
result in the creation of a market for copyright claims. It bears re-emphasizing
that the reference to a “market for claims” here includes not just situations
where the claim is acquired in its entirety, but also those where third parties
assume a portion of the risk associated with enforcing the claim by investing
in, or funding it directly.
The discussion first looks at certain structural realities of the copyright
entitlement and litigation, to highlight the need for such third party litigation
funding (II.A.), and then proceeds to show how the entry of third party funders
can provide copyright litigation with a host of direct and indirect benefits on
both the plaintiff and defendant sides (II.B.).
A. Why the Copyright System is Ripe for Litigation Funding
While copyright litigation is no doubt very similar to traditional
commercial litigation as a structural matter, it nonetheless embodies certain
characteristics that make it well-suited to the practice of litigation funding.
Two in particular deserve elaboration here: (i) the copyright entitlement’s
fundamental dependence on litigation; and (ii) the exorbitant costs of copyright
litigation (in comparison to other areas) and their distortionary effects on
copyright law and policy. In some ways the two features are clearly at odds
with each other, and copyright reform efforts have thus far done little to try and
align them.
Copyright law’s basic entitlement structure anticipates and operates in
the shadow of private litigation. As an analytical matter, copyright grants its
holder a set of exclusive rights in relation to the protected subject matter, i.e.,
the original expression.39 These rights revolve around the act of copying,
which is central to copyright law. All the same, since copyright’s subject
matter is intangible and therefore exhibits the characteristics of resource nonrivalry and non-excludability, the significance of the exclusive rights
machinery operates in large part through the correlative duty that it imposes on

38

See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1193 (2011) (advocating such a mechanism for the fashion industry).
39
17 U.S.C. §106 (2010).
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others.40 Copyright thus revolves around the “duty not to copy original
expression” that it imposes on all but the original owner in society.41
In other words, ownership over a tangible object endows its owner with
a set of exclusive rights to use the object. Yet, since the object is both rival and
excludable in nature, these rights enable the owner to use the object in
different ways without interference from others in society (i.e., non-owners).
Moving to copyright though, since the object is intangible expression, the
owner (the copyright holder) needs no actual enablement to use the object.42
As a physical matter, the object is perfectly capable of multiple, simultaneous
use (and copying) by individuals with little problem. Copyright injects an
artificial scarcity into this environment through its grant of exclusive rights.
But given the non-rival nature of the object being protected, these exclusive
rights disable non-owners (i.e., potential copiers) from interfering with the
copyright holder’s exclusive rights in the work.43 Copyright’s entitlement
framework is therefore rooted in the disabling duties that it imposes on nonowners in society. And since copyright is in the end a private law system, for
this disablement it relies heavily on the owner’s power, ability, and threat to
invoke the state’s coercive machinery to ensure its realization. The copyright
entitlement then, to put it simply, revolves analytically around the possibility
of litigation.
As a functional matter, the copyright entitlement is formally
determined for the first time only ever during litigation. Since it is premised on
automatic protection once a work is created and fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, litigation performs an important validation function for the
existence and scope of the entitlement. Unlike the patent entitlement, which
involves a formal prosecution process that results in the patentee obtaining a
prima facie entitlement accompanied by a strong presumption of validity,
copyright law contains no analogous review process.44 Litigation thus performs
more than just a remedial function in copyright law—i.e., merely correcting a
harm—but instead also an important constitutive function for the entitlement.
40

See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1669 (2012).
41
Id. at 1667-74. See also Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 844 (1993).
42
See T. Cyprian Williams, Property, Things in Action, and Copyright, 11 L. QUART. REV. 223, 232
(1895) (making a similar point about the centrality of forbearance to copyright law).
43
Balganesh, Obligatory Structure, supra note __, at 1670; id. at 226.
44
For a recent account of this difference see: David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual
Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 679 (2012) (“Patents vest only after an applicant successfully navigates
a cumbersome examination process administered by the federal Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
[while C]opyrights, by contrast, arise costlessly and often unintentionally, as soon as an author fixes a
work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression.”). This isn’t to suggest that the patent entitlement
isn’t subject to the vagaries of the litigation process as well, rendering it probabilistic. See Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERPS. 75 (2005).
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There remains additionally, an important respect in which copyright is
also different from the entitlement underlying other private causes of action
such as those involved in tort claims. While such private claims too are
determined only during litigation (i.e., by a court), the abstract entitlements
underlying them are almost never treated as alienable prior to their maturation
into specific actions. Thus, it is uncommon to speak of trading (or transferring
away) one’s ‘right not to be negligently injured,’ prior to a negligent act
actually transpiring.45 Copyright on the other hand is treated as a tradable
entitlement, in its unmatured form, making it analytically very different.
Indeed, the copyright entitlement’s tradability in its unmatured form
and its fundamental dependency on litigation caused some early scholars of the
common law to argue that copyright was nothing more than a “chose in
action”, i.e., an actionable claim.46 Since expression could never be
“possessed” as an object, copyright was thought to be a “claim” that could
“only be enforced by going to law”.47 Since all forms of property in the
common law were either choses in action or possession, and copyright was
clearly intended to be a tradable asset, this view insisted that it had to be
understood as a chose in action. Copyright law as a structural matter thus
fundamentally anticipates and depends on the possibility of litigation. Unlike
other substantive areas where litigation can be seen as performing as
vindicatory, remedial, or punitive function, litigation is of constitutive
analytical significance to copyright law.
This analytical reality however faces an obvious functional problem. In
spite of the centrality of litigation to copyright’s entitlement structure,
copyright litigation remains unaffordable to a large number of litigants. The
average cost of litigating a copyright case through trial ranges from $384,000
to over $2 million, for both plaintiffs and defendants.48 These costs have risen
dramatically over the last decade, which has in turn seen a corresponding
reduction in the number of copyright claims that are actually litigated in court.
In the year 2005, a total of 5,796 new copyright cases were filed.49 This figure
has seen a steady decline since, and by 2011 this figure shrunk to 2,297—an
astounding 60% drop.50 The Copyright Office attributes most of this to the rise
45

See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market for Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 383 (1989)
(defining the entitlement prior to injury as an “unmatured tort claim”). See also Alan Schwartz,
Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims": A Long Way Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REV.
423 (1989) (describing the problems inherent in allowing such claims to be traded).
46
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in litigation costs, and in 2011 began exploring the possibility of low-cost
“small claims” courts to decide copyright infringement cases.51 It thus
observed:
If a copyright owner hires a lawyer, the expenses can add up quickly.
Contingency fee arrangements are relatively rare in copyright lawsuits; thus
most copyright owners will have to pay an hourly fee for representation.
Lawyers charge hundreds of dollars per hour, which could reach a total of
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars when a case does not immediately
settle and instead requires discovery, motion practice, and trial.52

What makes copyright litigation rather expensive though is the
necessarily fact-intensive nature of the dispute. In bringing a claim, a plaintiff
must show actual copying by the defendant, which entails proof of access and
similarity between the works. If the works aren’t identical, the plaintiff also
needs to establish that the works are “substantially similar”, which is a
subjective question of fact.53 Courts treat both these issues as questions of fact,
and are justifiably reluctant to decide them on motions for summary
judgment.54 The same is largely true for the defendant as well. While fair use is
itself a question of law, the burden of establishing the facts that determine fair
use, most notably the “effect” of the defendant’s use on the market for the
plaintiff’s work,55 falls to the defendant.56 Discovery thus forms a large part of
the litigation expenses.57
Litigation costs influence parties’ behavior.58 In addition to influencing
parties’ litigiousness, i.e., their willingness to bring a claim in court, litigation
costs also affect parties’ primary behavior, when the substantive regime in
question is premised on inducing behavior of a specific kind. Tort law is a
prime example, where the costs of litigation play a major role in a regime’s
ability to deter negligent behavior. One scholar thus notes that “costly
litigation implies that the tort system fails to compel actors to exercise socially
51

Copyright Office, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Notice of Inquiry, 76 FED. REG. 66,758
(2011).
52
Id. at 66,759-60.
53
Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012)
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54
See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977) .
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17 U.S.C. §107(4) (2010).
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See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 501 U.S. 569 (1994); 3 NIMMER, supra note __, at
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57
See Sharon Cullars, Trends in IP Litigation Costs, LEGAL FIN. J., Nov. 24, 2011,
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high litigation costs is collecting discovery.”);
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optimal precaution” and thus fails in its deterrent function.59 When individuals
know that the costs of litigation make it unlikely that suits will be brought, the
law’s ability to deter behavior begins to diminish in large measure. If litigation
costs can influence a regime’s ability to deter behavior, they must in equal
measure be able to influence a regime’s ability to incentivize behavior as well.
And if copyright’s primary purpose lies in providing creators with an incentive
to create—as courts and policy-makers routinely reiterate60—then, rising
litigation costs will in a similar vein impede the system’s realization of its core
objective. The decline in litigation rates might thus suggest not just that parties
are unwilling to litigate their claims, but rather a decline in the very utilization
of the copyright system, especially given the centrality of litigation to its
functioning as noted previously.
It is of course hard to assess the exact causes for the drop in copyright
litigation rates, without disaggregating the empirical evidence further. Yet, the
anecdotal evidence underlying accompanying the Copyright Office’s recent
study seems to suggest that copyright’s litigation costs are doing more than just
deterring lawsuits. In its submission, the American Society of Media
Photographers (ASMP) for instance, described how these costs, and the lack of
a cost-effective mechanism of redressal were “mak[ing] the investment
necessary to become and remain a professional photographer a staggering and
constant burden,61” in effect then deterring the very creative enterprise, rather
than just the commencement of lawsuits.
Copyright’s high litigation costs also discourage defendants from
contesting palpably frivolous, and overbroad infringement claims by copyright
owners. When offered a settlement that is much lower than what they would
have had to spend defending the claim—even if they know for sure that they
are likely to succeed on the merits—rational defendants have good reason to
prefer settling to litigating.62 This only encourages copyright owners to make
overbroad claims. Some courts then unthinkingly treat these settlements as
evidence of vibrant “licensing markets” to constrain the scope of the fair use
59
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defense doctrinally.63 In effect then, defendants’ failure to litigate fair use
effectively whittles away its scope and significance. The fair use doctrine is
however more than just a “defense” in copyright law. As copyright’s primary
safety valve, it safeguards a host of important First Amendment and free
speech interests, and functions as an incentive for downstream creativity as
well.64 The functional evisceration of fair use thus has real downsides for
social welfare and threatens to undermine the very legitimacy of the copyright
system.
In short then, copyright’s exorbitant litigation costs affect both
plaintiffs and defendants, distort the system’s core objectives and safety
valves, and seem to show no sign of declining. Yet, few solutions seem to
focus directly on the problem. They instead focus on reforming copyright
doctrine, the law-making process or the adjudicative process. “Litigation” and
the litigation-process as such are blamed for these costs and treated as a part of
the problem rather than the solution. Litigation funding allows copyright law to
directly address the problem of spiraling litigation costs without undermining
its very dependence on litigation.
B. Third Party Funding in Copyright Law
Having seen why copyright litigation remains structurally well-suited
to third party funding, this Section moves to identifying the concrete
advantages that copyright law, practice, and policy are likely to see by
allowing third parties to acquire and invest in infringement claims.
1. Reducing Incentive Dissipation
Copyright’s raison d’être is thought to lie in its ability to induce the
production of creative expression.65 Despite the lack of empirical confirmation
for this theory, it continues to inform copyright law-making, judicial
interpretation of copyright doctrine, and scholarly writing on the subject.66 By
promising creators a set of temporally limited exclusive rights in any original
work of expression that they produce, copyright law is thought to incentivize
63
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the creation of such expression.67 In other words, by promising creators
recourse to the state’s mechanism for disabling others from making
unauthorized copies of an original work of authorship, copyright law is thought
to motivate the production of such work. Now if recourse to the state’s
enforcement mechanism to prevent unauthorized copying is unaffordable (as
noted earlier), and rational creators know this upfront, this fact will certainly
interfere with copyright’s ability to act as an inducement.
Assume that that cost of making a work—to Anne, an author—is
$2,000 and that she also knows that by selling copies of the work in the
market, she can earn $5,000, making a net profit of $3,000. Copyright law is
thought to signal to the creator that by disabling others from copying the work
(once created), it will allow her to exploit the full market potential, i.e., $5,000,
for copies of the work; and in the process induce her to produce the work. Now
assume that a competitor appropriates (i.e., copies) Anne’s work, as a result of
which the market for the original shrinks to sales of $1,000, below her initial
investment, i.e., her costs of creation. At this point, for Anne to be incentivized
to seek these lost profits in an infringement action, she will need to be assured
of a net gain at the end, taking into account the costs of both creation and
litigation.68 In our scenario, this means that for Anne to recover $4,000 (the
lost profits), the cost of litigation must be well below $3,000, to make it
economically viable. If this is unlikely, and she knows this is in advance (i.e.,
prior to creation), her rational economic incentive to create the work will
altogether disappear, since she will recognize simultaneously that (i)
substitutive copying is likely to impact her profits, (ii) the costs of
commencing an action against the copier to recoup these profits are very high,
and (iii) as a result, they each individually and in conjunction make the
creative activity altogether unprofitable.
The costs of copyright litigation thus influence not just the decision
whether to litigate, but in scenarios where copying is both easy and very likely,
they are also likely to affect the decision whether to create the work to begin
with. The same holds true in varying degrees even when the unauthorized
copying doesn't cause the creator’s profits to fall below the break-even point.
Table 1 is illustrative, which shows that even when creators expect large
returns on their creative work and the extent of infringement increases, the
67
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costs of litigating the infringement claim begin to rise exponentially too, in
effect lowering the incentive to create quite dramatically. The economic
decision to create is thus impacted by high litigation costs, a factor that is
especially true for individual and one-off creators. The inefficiency of
litigation effectively dilutes and dissipates the economic incentive that the
copyright system purports to grant authors.
Table 1: Incentive Reduction Owing to Litigation Costs
Cost of
Creation

Expected
Sales

Expected
Benefit
(Prelitigation)

Lost
Profits
(Owing
to
copying)

Expected
Litigation
Costs

Expected
Benefit
(PostLitigation)

Reduction
in
Incentive

2,000

4,000

2,000

2,000

5,000

–3,000

250%

2,000

6,000

4,000

3,000

5,000

–1,000

125%

2,000

10,000

8,000

5,000

5,000

3,000

62.5%

2,000

20,000

18,000

10,000

7,000

11,000

50%

2,000

30,000

28,000

15,000

10,000

18,000

35.7%

2,000

100,000

98,000

50,000

20,000

78,000

20.4%

It might be thought that copyright’s allowance for plaintiffs to elect for
statutory damages and recover reasonable attorney’s fees alleviates this
problem.69 In reality though, these mechanisms still require copyright owners
to make significant out of pocket payments to sustain the litigation, in the hope
of obtaining these remedies, which in addition, are “not guaranteed”.70 It is
precisely because of copyright’s rising litigation costs and their effect on
creators that the Copyright Office has recently begun considering the
possibility of alternative “small claims” dispute resolution mechanisms where
the litigation costs are likely to be significantly lower.71
Litigation funding, while not directly lowering the costs of copyright
litigation in the abstract, nonetheless can ensure that effect of these costs is felt
most directly on someone other than the creator. In the process, it reduces the
extent to which these costs influence the incentive to create, the institution’s
primary purpose. When a creator’s work is purportedly infringed by a copier,
litigation funding would now allow third parties to either acquire the
infringement claim from the creator and pursue the claim directly, or instead
enable them to fund the claim by fronting capital to the creator, who will still
bring the action in his/her own name.72 In such an arrangement, the creator is
69
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able to obtain upfront payment for its claim (either directly or indirectly),
which while likely to be less than the total expected value of the claim, is
nonetheless sure to be higher than what the creator might have gotten on her
own. This is so for two possible reasons. One, the litigation funder is likely to
have lower litigation costs, making the lawsuit potentially lucrative, with some
of those benefits passing on to the creator. Two, the litigation funder—unlike
the creator—will be able to value the lawsuit based not just on the creator’s
lost profits, but on the availability of statutory damages, since this now
becomes a realistic possibility.
The litigation funder has obvious incentives to enter into such
arrangements. Remember that a litigation funder is usually an entity with
expertise in litigation. The ability to accurately value a claim and assess the
probability of a favorable outcome, the ready access to large stores of capital,
and the expertise to run the process efficiently are characteristic features of
such funders. The funder is thus well positioned to take advantage of copyright
law’s allowance for statutory damages, since the out of pocket expenses
needed to run the litigation are hardly a deterrent. Going back to our earlier
hypothetical involving Anne the creator, reveals how this might work.
To Anne, the costs of litigating the claim for lost profits of $4,000
might be $3,000, making it economically impractical to pursue. But to a
litigation funder, XYZ, Inc, these costs might be significantly lower—say
$1,000. If XYZ now approaches Anne and offers to pay her $2,000 for the
claim (which is worth $4,000), Anne still makes a net gain of $1,000 in the
overall scheme of things, effectively preserving her incentive to create. XYZ
too can expect a gain from the litigation (of $1,000) as well, even if lost profits
were the sole basis for valuing the claim. In reality though, even if XYZ’s
costs of litigation are the same as what they were for Anne, XYZ might value
the claim much higher—say at $20,000—under copyright’s statutory damages
regime.73 Since XYZ has the liquidity for the large out of pocket expenses,
which are still likely to be far lower than this recovery, especially if attorney’s
fees are also awarded, the lawsuit now becomes a potentially lucrative
investment opportunity. Very importantly though, this might even have an
effect on Anne’s arrangement with XYZ. If Anne knows that XYZ values the
litigation not just on the basis of lost profits but instead based on the possible
recovery of statutory damages, Anne is likely to negotiate for a much higher
upfront payment for the claim. XYZ might thus choose to pay Anne $6,000 if
it knows that statutory damages are very likely, based on its assessment of the
73
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claim. Anne thus stands to earn a net profit of $5,000 from the overall scheme
now. If creators such as Anne know that litigation funders exist to assist them
with their infringement claims, their presence not only preserves their original
incentive to create, but introduces the distinct possibility of enlarging it, by
making the availability of statutory damages seem realistic.
In effect then, litigation funding is likely do two things simultaneously
for copyright’s incentive structure. First, it will likely prevent the complete
dissipation of the incentive to create, by ensuring that creators don't have to
feel compelled to litigate the claim themselves in order to recover lost profits.
They could rely on third parties to enforce the claim, and thereby obtain a
significant portion of these lost profits. Second, it will form a bridge between
the creator and the Copyright Act’s provision for statutory damages. By
introducing a new set of participants into the system for whom the availability
of large statutory damages after expensive litigation is both an independent
incentive and of little hardship, it raises the market value of creators’
actionable infringement claims and allows them to internalize a significant
portion of this surplus. In the process, it allows for the possibility that
copyright litigation might, counter-intuitively, now actively enhance creators’
incentives to produce.
2. Lowering Agency Costs
A second benefit of litigation funding in copyright remains the
possibility that it will lower agency costs between clients and lawyers in
monitoring and enforcing infringement. Agency costs originate in a principalagent problem, where an agent tasked with protecting a principal’s interest has
insufficient incentives to do so, which produces a net welfare loss.74 It arises
owing to the “the impossibility of complete contracting when one party (the
agent) has discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that
affects the wealth of another party (the principal).75” It originates in situations
where the principal has no way of monitoring the implementation of an
arrangement with the agent, as a result of which the principal has little basis to
know whether the agent’s own conduct, or external factors produced a certain,
less than perfectly desirable outcome.76
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While agency costs are endemic to the attorney-client relationship in all
substantive areas, they remain exacerbated in copyright law for a variety of
inter-related reasons. As a direct consequence of its idiosyncratic subject
matter (i.e., expression) that is protected automatically upon creation and
fixation, copyright law operates primarily through standards rather than rules.
As is well known, standards, which tend to be imprecise and open-ended, lack
the certainty of rules and entail higher costs in their application.77 Actors, who
seek to be guided by the law, are the principal bearers of these costs, which
usually manifest themselves either in the time and effort needed to understand
the law and precedents, in obtaining professional legal advice, and in needing a
comprehensive process of adjudication for courts to fill the content of these
standards circumstantially ex post.78 Copyright’s unending standards thus
exacerbate the information asymmetry between non-specialist creator/copier
and his or her lawyer, which is the basis of the principal-agent problem.79 And
perhaps most importantly, this is so for both plaintiffs and defendants.
Take the plaintiff’s side first. In situations where a defendant’s copying
isn’t literal or verbatim, a plaintiff is obligated to establish that the defendant’s
work is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s protected work, to establish a
prima facie case of infringement.80 As is obvious from its very title, substantial
similarity is hardly a straightforward question, and is by most accounts,
copyright law’s most complex mechanism.81 Determining whether it is met in
an individual case is a probabilistic assessment that entails examining a host of
precedents and expert reports, and predicting a jury’s intuitive response to the
comparison. On the defendant’s side, “fair use” is at once copyright law’s
primary defense, but also its most uncertain doctrine.82 Note that all of the
principal-agent problems that we previously discussed, apply with equal force
to defendants in copyright cases as well. Determining whether a use is noninfringing under the fair use doctrine in similar fashion requires resort to expert
legal advice, in order to predict what a court is likely to do. Once again, the
information asymmetry between principal and agent comes to be exacerbated.
Indeed, for copyright defendants, empirical data too seems to suggest that
avoiding any reliance on expert advice—and thereby minimizing both
77
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litigation and agency costs—seems to be a preferred option, even when it is
overall welfare-minimizing and inefficient (i.e., when the defendant does
indeed have a valid claim of fair use).83
To see how these costs impact copyright plaintiffs and defendants,
consider the following hypothetical. Assume that Anne, our creator from the
previous hypothetical, identifies the infringement that is causing her to lose
profits, chooses to litigate the claim, and to this end retains the law firm ABC
LLP for the same. Seeing her unwillingness to pay the firm’s exorbitant “perhour” charges, the firm offers to litigate the matter on a contingency fee basis.
It agrees to take 30% of any settlement or judgment, instead of its hourly rate
of $200 per hour. Early on in the litigation, the defendant agrees to settle the
matter instead of proceeding to trial, and offers to settle the claim for $3,900.
ABC has invested no more than two billable hours of time into the matter in
all.
Let’s leave aside for now any question of Anne’s ex ante incentives to
create and how the litigation costs might impact that.84 In this scenario, ABC
makes $1,300 from the settlement, and having spent two billable hours (worth
$400 in all), its net gain in $900. Anne takes $2,600 from the settlement. On
the face of things, this outcome seems fine for all parties involved: Anne
breaks even, the firm makes a net gain, and neither plaintiff nor defendant
wastes large expenses in protracted copyright litigation. Assume however that
an extra hour’s worth of research (say, into the jurisprudence of substantial
similarity, to allege that the defendant’s copying might have allowed the court
to decide the matter on summary judgment) would have forced the defendant
to raise its settlement offer by another $600 to $4,500. Assuming that ABC
knows this to be likely, in deciding whether to spend the extra time doing this
research, ABC has no incentive to do so. For even though it will raise the
award by $400 for Anne (making her payout $3,000), the extra effort produces
no net gain for the law firm, ABC. The extra hour is worth $200 to them,
which is also exactly what they will likely make from the increased settlement.
The agent’s (i.e., ABC’s) failure to make this extra effort now causes the
principal (Anne) a loss of $400, which is a welfare loss. Anne has no way of
knowing this, since her ability to monitor ABC’s actions is very limited. This
welfare loss is entirely a result of the principal-agent problem.
Even if Anne had chosen to be billed on an hourly basis, the problem
would have manifested itself, but in a different form. In the initial settlement
offer, Anne would have made $3,500, and the firm $400. Here however, ABC
would have had every reason to continue negotiating with the defendant for
every minor increment in the settlement. Thus if it takes ABC an additional
five hours to raise the settlement by an added $750, it might choose to do so to
83
84
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make an additional $1000, and raise Anne’s settlement to $4,650. Again Anne
would have no way of knowing this, or monitoring ABC’s incremental actions.
All the same, Anne is paying $1000 for the added $750, producing an
analogous welfare loss of $250, caused once again by the principal-agent
problem.
The welfare loss that these situations produce together with the costs it
would take for a principal to effectively monitor the agent’s actions to ensure
compliance, constitute the “agency costs” produced.85 The principal-agent
problem, and the accompanying agency costs/welfare losses that it produces
are the result of a misalignment of parties’ interests, which produces
contradictory incentives. An obvious solution is thus one that aligns parties’
interests, or at least minimizes the possibility that they point in opposite
directions.86 In the copyright context, the extensive information asymmetry
between lawyer and client exacerbates this. This is where the involvement of
third parties will help.
Litigation funding arrangements allow for control—complete or
substantial—over the copyright litigation process to be vested in the
entity/individual actually bearing its full costs. In the process, it effectively
eliminates the moral hazard that legal representation entails. Litigation funders
are usually entities with significant legal expertise of their own, which would
allow them to avoid relying entirely on outside representation to value, litigate,
and settle the copyright claims that they acquire.87 The process of claim
acquisition thus allows such funders to obtain the claim from plaintiffs and
litigate it on their own. This in turn situates ownership and control over the
process in a single entity. Even when the funding is short of an outright
acquisition—for instance, partial funding, or an investment—it still ordinarily
relegates a good deal of control over the process to the third party funder,
specifically in order to allow it to ensure that the funding is used effectively,
and to avoid the moral hazard previously identified.88
In short, the principal-agent problem is pervasive in copyright litigation
and produces a host of social welfare losses, which a market for infringement
claims would serve to minimize quite significantly.
3. Lowering the Costs of Defendant Risk-Aversion
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Defendant risk aversion remains a major problem in copyright law. In
addition to generating a host of socially inefficient practices, it also routinely
distorts interpretations of the fair use doctrine.89 Solutions to the problem have
almost always focused on changes to copyright doctrine or institutions in order
to introduce more bright-line rules into the system, in the belief that this would
introduce greater certainty for litigants threatened with lawsuits.90 The fair use
doctrine, the device around which much of this risk aversion is seen, is thus
thought to be in need of serious reform. And yet, there seems little reason to
believe that courts or Congress will do anything at all to amend the current
version of the doctrine.91 Here again, litigation funding can ameliorate the
situation—at least partially.
Litigation funding is ordinarily thought to operate exclusively on the
plaintiff’s side. This need not be the case. In several common law jurisdictions,
a market has begun to emerge for what is known as “after the event” (or ATE)
insurance.92 In these situations, a third party insurer enters the picture and
offers to insure a party—i.e., the defendant—after litigation has been
commenced.93 The premium for these policies is usually based on the unique
nature of the claim and the possibility of a successful defense. The insurer in
these policies, very importantly, doesn't offer to insure against the actual
outcome or verdict, but rather against the expenses that the defendant needs to
incur to defend the claim in court.94 This includes attorney’s fees, litigation
costs, the costs of discovery, and the like. Indeed, in jurisdictions where the
market for such policies is fairly robust on both the plaintiff and defendant
sides, courts today allow claims for fee-shifting (i.e., to recover any attorney’s
fees) to include the premiums that a party has paid for any after the event
insurance.95
We could envision an expansion of this model where the defendant
insures not just the expenses of litigation, but also the underlying
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award/settlement as well. In this scenario, the defendant would purchase
insurance from a third party that covers the expenses of litigation and a likely
settlement/award figure, which is based not on what the plaintiff seeks in its
claim or settlement offer, but rather on what the third party insurer objectively
values the suit at, based on its own independent assessment of its ability to
defend the claim, or force the plaintiff to a lower settlement. In recent work,
Jonathan Molot has made the tentative case for such a modification of the
insurance model, into what he calls the “market for litigation risk”.96 He notes
however that for this model to work, among other things, insurers would need
to develop a way of valuing the litigation risk being acquired, which is highly
problematic given how individualized it is likely to be.97 The heterogeneity of
the risk is thought to impede insurers’ ability to pool it together.98 Molot
however assumes the third party insurer’s portfolio of litigation risks to be
sufficiently diversified—either in actuality or as a goal. In other words, the
problems of individualized risk are enhanced by the diverse areas that the
insurer is looking at. If the insurer were to instead focus on one specialized
area, and rely on the valuations and assessments of its lawyers (rather than
actuaries) as Molot suggests,99 a large part of this problem is likely to
disappear. Indeed, this is how a fair use insurance market might begin to
emerge in copyright litigation.
While uncertain to the lay individual, the fair use doctrine is hardly
completely unpredictable. With the vast amount of fair use jurisprudence that
has developed over the years, coupled with the fact that it is a question for the
court and not the jury, lawyers are today in a position to make a decent enough
probabilistic assessment of whether a fair use defense remains viable or not in
any particular case. In an extensive new empirical study, Matthew Sag reviews
all fair use decisions handed down by federal courts to see if the doctrine is
indeed predictably applied, and whether some coherence can be seen in cases
decided using the doctrine.100 Sag concludes that contrary to common
perception, fair use decisions are indeed predictable along multiple
dimensions. He goes on to note that in practice, the doctrine is hardly as
incoherent as is believed to be.101 Over time and context, we today have a vast
amount of fair use jurisprudence that actuaries—working with lawyers, as
Molot suggests—should be able to synthesize into probabilistic assessments of
the defense succeeding in any particular case.
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Third party litigation funders might thus, with the right set of
procedural changes, begin to offer a tailored insurance product to defendants in
copyright infringement claims—known as fair use insurance. The insurer
would thus assess the likelihood of a defendant successfully raising the fair use
defense in a copyright claim and offer to acquire the litigation risk from the
defendant in return for a premium. If the premium is tied directly to the likely
payout that the insurer will have to make, it may well be lower than a
settlement offer made by the plaintiff, especially when the fair use defense is
very strong. Copyright law already contains a provision allowing for attorney
fee shifting, which applies to defendants just as much as it does to plaintiffs.102
If courts began interpreting it purposively, and followed the approach of U.K.
courts in allowing litigation insurance premiums to be recovered as well,103 we
might well expect to see defendants transferring their litigation risk to an
insurer, who then takes over the defense from the litigant (as a subrogation)
instead of defendants caving in and settling for the amount demanded by the
plaintiff. The insurer might hope that its entry and expertise will force the
plaintiff to offer a low settlement, or indeed withdraw the claim altogether
where it is without merit. Consider the following hypothetical.
ABC Studios commences an action against Joe for using a 10 second
clip of its new blockbuster movie in a documentary film that Joe makes for his
college project. ABC sends him a cease and desist letter (which he ignores),
and then threaten him with damages of $150,000 for willful infringement.
ABC also offers to settle the matter if he admits liability and pays $12,000 for
a license. Joe knows that his use is very likely (if not certainly) a fair use of the
work, but recognizes that even if he were to litigate the claim, it would cost
him $20,000 (in attorney’s fees) to do so. Even though current law allows
courts to award successful defendants their “reasonable” attorney’s fees,104 to
Joe the risk of this award not covering his fees and the need for immediate
liquidity cover the out-of-pocket expenses that this entails, makes him more
willing to accede to ABC’s demands and settle. This in many ways represents
precisely what happens today. If litigation funding were to develop here, we
might expect an entity, let’s call it LF Inc., a litigation funder, to provide
copyright defendants with an insurance product once the claim is filed. LF,
Inc., would be an entity with significant expertise in copyright matters, with
the capital to take on the risks that Joe is averse to. To make it viable for Joe,
LF would have to offer Joe a premium lower than the projected settlement
102
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offer from ABC. Say, LF offers Joe insurance for $6,000. LF knows fully
well—from its assessment of past fair use cases—that ABC’s claim is (a)
without merit, (b) as a result likely to also result in an award of attorney’s fees,
and (c) that it has the ability and expertise to deal with the matter at a cost
much lower than it would take for Joe to do so. In acquiring the defense claim
from Joe, LF also hopes that ABC will come to recognize that the bargaining
asymmetry which previously existed has now been eliminated, making it more
willing to withdraw its claim altogether, or at worst to settle for a significantly
lower amount (~$1,000)—rendering its own investment profitable.
As an insurer with the ability to spread its risk across a wide range of
parties, LF is likely to be far less risk averse than Joe, an individual litigant. LF
also has the resources and expertise at its disposal, to lower its risk. This in
turn allows it to fund defendants with otherwise high-risk claims. While such
funding certainly doesn't eliminate defendant risk-aversion in its entirety and in
some ways is parasitic on it, it has the direct effect of reducing the socially
wasteful costs associated with such risk aversion—both to the defendant, and
the copyright system as a whole. In the aggregate, the funder’s risk-taking
neutralizes some of the effects of the defendant’s risk aversion.
A more direct solution to the problem might seem to lie in reducing
defendants’ overall litigation costs, thereby curtailing their risk aversion and its
negative effects at its source. As a practical matter though, this is highly
unlikely. First, extremely high litigation costs are hardly unique to copyright
litigation. Most forms of commercial litigation face the same problem, and
given that copyright disputes are indeed litigated in general (rather than
specialized) federal courts, copyright litigants must endure the realities of the
overall system. What makes it problematic for copyright however, is how
heavily dependent the entitlement and its functioning are on such litigation.
Thus, any lowering of costs will need to happen system-wide. Second,
plaintiff-side lawyers—and the legal profession more generally—have little to
gain from such a reduction. Both these factors render it highly unlikely that
lowering litigation costs remains at all a viable solution. The entry of defendant
funders however ensures that the full impact of these costs isn’t felt solely by
defendants, which in turn distorts copyright doctrine.
To be sure, the entry of defense funders will certainly not eliminate the
socially wasteful effects of defendant risk aversion altogether. In the
hypothetical above, Joe still is forced to buy insurance (and transfer the
defense to LF) when he shouldn’t have to do so at all as a matter of law, owing
to the fair use doctrine. All that LF’s entry is able to achieve is a reduction,
albeit a significant one, in the wasted expense. At the same time though, as
more and more defense funders begin to enter copyright litigation, and the
market becomes more robust, we are likely to see a huge reduction in the
number of frivolous lawsuits being brought, i.e., lawsuits where a defendant
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has a complete defense, and the plaintiff is merely seeking to take advantage of
a defendant’s risk aversion. Just as funding on the claim (i.e., plaintiff’s) side
forms a bridge between the creator and the regime of statutory damages,
funding on the defense side is likely to form an analogous bridge between a
defendant with a strong defense and copyright’s fee-shifting provision, if
sufficiently strengthened.
4. Valuing and Sorting Claims
In addition to performing an allocative function, markets in numerous
contexts also perform the important purpose of enabling a price-based
“commensuration” of anything transacted in.105 Commensuration refers to the
process of comparing “different entities according to a common metric.106” A
market for copyright claims would thus, in addition to allowing the claim to
vest in an entity best positioned to enforce it, also result in a process wherein
those very entities come to value the claim based on its probability of
succeeding. With their purchase of or investment in the claim becoming public,
this would have the effect of sending a signal to the parties involved, and
indeed the court, on the strength of the claim in question.
This is especially likely to be true in situations where the third party’s
involvement is an outright acquisition of the claim, i.e., a claim transfer.107 At
the time of commencement of the action, or during discovery thereafter, a third
party’s acquisition of the claim and the price of such acquisition are likely to
become public. This will in turn send an important signal – both to the other
side, and potentially to courts as well. To the other side, it will signal the
possibility that the claim is with some merit, evidenced in the third party’s
willingness to assume some of the risk that it entails. Meritless or frivolous
claims are unlikely to attract such investment or acquisition. To a court, in
similar vein, the third party’s involvement might signal the absence of a
frivolous or meritless claim. Yet, as a functional matter, what is likely to be
more important to the system than what an actual acquisition or investment
signals, is likely to be what the absence of such an acquisition of investment
signals in a robust market.
In due course, when infringement claims of a certain kind are routinely
financed by third parties, a litigant’s inability to secure such third party
involvement might communicate a signal that the claim has a low probability
105
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of success, or indeed that it is meritless. This is in turn likely to make a
defendant more willing to contest the claim, rather than settling early. In
addition, this considered non-involvement by third parties is also likely to deter
plaintiffs themselves from bringing such claims. In other words, a third party’s
refusal to fund or acquire an infringement claim for reasons having to do with
the strength of the claim might in reality work to deter the very entry of such
claims into the litigation system.108
The idea of third parties being involved in the funding and acquisition
of legal claims has met with a good deal of objection from those who believe
that it is likely to raise the overall volume of litigation in courts, and encourage
lawsuits to be brought where previously none might have.109 Some have even
suggested that it is likely to result in more frivolous lawsuits being brought.110
Yet it is indeed more likely that just the opposite will occur. When a potential
plaintiff receives information from a third party to the effect that the claim is
very weak and unworthy of outside investment, the plaintiff is highly likely to
abandon it altogether. Litigation, it is often forgotten, involves large emotional,
dignitary, and reputational costs, besides the obvious first order costs of its
own.111 Max Schanzenbach and David Dana point this out, in advocating for
the greater involvement of third parties in tort litigation. They thus note that
“the flip side to communicating the high value of strong, low-risk claims, is
that it will also communicate the low value of nuisance claims [and a]ssuming
a distaste for litigation among most people, a strong ex ante signal of claim
value may act as a deterrent to low-value claims.112” When the probability of
success is objectively calibrated—using third parties—even an otherwise risktaking or over-optimistic plaintiff is likely to exhibit a reduced willingness to
bring and continue the claim in court.
In short then, the entry of third parties into copyright litigation is likely
to introduce a valuable sorting mechanism into the system. Key beneficiaries
of this sorting are likely to be potential defendants, courts, and on occasion
plaintiffs themselves.
III. STRUCTURING A MARKET FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
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Having seen how the involvement of third parties in copyright
litigation—through a market for actionable copyright claims—might serve to
benefit both plaintiffs and defendants, and in the process reduce the various
social costs traditionally associated with protracted litigation, this Part moves
to describing how such a market might take shape and some of the necessary
doctrinal changes that will need to be put in place to encourage and regulate
the development of this market.
Section III.A describes five possible market arrangements wherein third
parties play a role in copyright litigation, III.B then looks at some of the
current doctrinal hurdles that serve as impediments to such arrangements.
A. Possible Forms of Third-Party Involvement in Copyright Litigation
As noted earlier, the “market for copyright claims” need not always
involve an outright purchase of the actionable claim by a third party.113 All that
it entails, as used here, is the process by which a third party acquires some
degree of control over the copyright litigation by funding a primary litigating
party, and through which the third party hopes to obtain a net benefit when the
litigation ends. Arrangements short of outright sales are thus equally effective
market mechanisms.
1. Assignments of the Right to Sue for Infringement
The most obvious market mechanism involving actionable copyright
claims is likely to be instances where the third party acquires the claim as an
asset from the plaintiff in return for valuable consideration.114 It is important to
understand that in this arrangement, the third party obtains no interest
whatsoever in the actual copyrighted work itself, i.e., it obtains no interest in
the exclusive rights obtained by the original copyright holder under the
copyright system. The third party merely obtains the unenumerated right to
commence an action for copyright infringement either generally, or against
defendants specified in the arrangement. The assignment can be prospective,
i.e., for yet-to-occur infringements, or retroactive, i.e., for already accrued
instances of infringement.115
In ordinary assignments of actionable claims, the original litigant drops
out of the picture altogether and the assignee thereafter commences (or
113
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continues) the litigation in its own name against the defendant.116 For this to
work, it is thus essential that the law allow a third party assignee to bring the
action in its own name without imposing onerous standing requirements on the
third party, which render the acquisition meaningless. Courts today are divided
on whether copyright law allows third parties to bring infringement actions
when they acquire the bare right to sue—a factor that is likely to inhibit the
early development of this arrangement.117
Assignments provide obvious advantages over most other forms of
arrangements, for third parties. They give the third party complete control and
autonomy over the litigation and settlement processes, since the original
plaintiff drops out of the picture. They also allow the third party to itself
alienate (or re-assign) the claim to another third party should it need to,
without any restrictions at all. Assignments are also the most beneficial
arrangement from an information-sharing perspective. With the court and the
public easily obtaining information about the third party’s direct involvement
in the claim, the sorting and classification advantages discussed earlier are
much more likely to be realized.118
2. Non-Recourse Financing of Infringement Lawsuits
Instead of acquiring the lawsuit as an actionable claim from the original
plaintiff, third parties might instead choose to invest in the copyright
infringement lawsuit through a financing arrangement. In other forms of
litigation, such financing is normally done through a non-recourse loan, under
which the plaintiff accepts no personal liability for repayment, and satisfaction
of the debt (i.e., the loan) is to occur exclusively through the proceeds from the
litigation—either the judgment award or the settlement.119 Unlike in an
assignment, the original plaintiff continues to remain a part of the litigation
since the lawsuit continues in its name. The third-party funder would
nonetheless come to exert a good degree of control over the litigation process
and strategy through a contractual arrangement with the plaintiff.
Arrangements of this kind leave the third party funder with less control
and autonomy over the lawsuit than in an assignment, and are likely to be seen
116
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in situations where the plaintiff (and its team) have significant expertise in
copyright litigation, which the third party funder trusts and is willing to rely
on. In addition to needing an independent contractual arrangement on the
question of control, these arrangements also serve the information disclosure
function to a far lesser degree, since the role of the third party is never made
public—and is only ever learnt of during discovery.120 As a result, the
possibility of any ex ante sorting and signaling is diminished quite
significantly (or indeed eliminated). Lastly, these arrangements also leave the
third party with fewer exit options. Whereas in an assignment, the third party
can readily alienate the claim to another party, or choose to terminate the
litigation, in such financing arrangements, the third party has little ability to
stop the lawsuit, and would need to find another investor to acquire the loan
made to the plaintiff.
Non-recourse financing of this kind is likely to be seen in copyright
infringement lawsuits between two large commercial competitors, and less so
in individual lawsuits where an assignment is likely to be preferred by both the
original plaintiff and the third party.121
3. Tailored Exclusive Licenses
A third way that third parties might choose to be involved in the
infringement action is unique to copyright (and patent) law. It seeks to work
around the ambiguity surrounding the permissibility of open assignments to
sue, by using the law’s standing requirements. The copyright statute treats an
“exclusive license” as a transfer of copyright ownership for the purposes of the
statute,122 and additionally allows copyright’s bundle of exclusive rights to be
disaggregated and broken down into idiosyncratic and narrow sub-rights in
whatever way parties choose.123 Thus, not only can the exclusive right to
distribute the work be licensed independent of other rights, but that right itself
can be broken down further (e.g., the exclusive right to distribute the work in
Santa Clara County, San Jose City, California) and licensed or assigned
independently.124 The reason this matters is because the law then confers on
the legal or beneficial owner of “an exclusive right” the power to commence an
action for infringement of that right.125 What this means then is that in order to
effect a de facto assignment of the right to sue for copyright infringement to a
120
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third party, the original copyright holder has to grant the third party an
exclusive license that is artificially tailored to the market/context in which the
infringement in occurring. This confers standing on the third party to bring the
action in its own name, and the artificial tailoring of the license ensures that the
original copyright owner (i.e., the licensor) has no reason to worry about the
third party exploiting the work or doing anything other than bringing the
infringement action. This is best illustrated through an example.
Assume that Jonathan is a first-time novelist based in New York City
who self-publishes his book The Seasons in hardback on October 1, 2010 and
begins marketing it shortly thereafter. He retains all the rights to his work. On
January 1, 2011 Jonathan learns that a publisher located in Cambridge, MA has
begun making paperback copies of his book and distributing them without his
permission. Jonathan wants to bring an action against the publisher, and is
approached by TF Inc., a litigation funder, on June 1, 2011. Instead of an
assignment of the bare right to sue—which is of questionable validity—
Jonathan grants TF an “exclusive license to reproduce The Seasons in
paperback book form in Cambridge, MA, from January 1 to June 1, 2011”.
This arrangement confers on TF the power to commence the lawsuit for
copyright infringement on its own, since it is the legal owner of the right in
question, even though the right has been chopped up along the dimensions of
time (i.e., 6 months), geography (i.e., Cambridge, MA) and form (i.e.,
paperback). Even though TF obtains an exclusive license, the retroactive and
limited nature of the grant render it highly unlikely (if not improbable) that TF
will actually exploit the work by reproducing it. The effect of the exclusive
license is thus that it operates exactly like an assignment, and is of
unquestionable validity.
The obvious downside to using tailored exclusive licenses instead of
actual assignments of the actionable claim is that it requires identifying
specific defendants by region or market, before the license is executed—i.e.,
the tailoring. An assignment of the bare right to sue on the other hand doesn't
require such identification and can transfer the power to bring infringement
suits against whole classes of defendants, which an exclusive license cannot.
The exclusive license route is thus likely to be used only till such time as
courts (and perhaps Congress) come to accept the legality of assignments of
the right to sue for copyright infringement.126
4. Assignments of the Copyright in its Entirety
The most obvious way for a third party to be involved in a copyright
infringement action is of course by acquiring the copyright in the infringed
work in its entirety. Once properly executed, the third party becomes the new
126
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owner of the copyrighted work, with the power to commence an infringement
action.127 Much like the assignment of the actionable claim, the original owner
exits the picture altogether, giving the third party complete control over the
process. However, unlike in the assignment of just the claim, the original
owner retains no rights whatsoever to continue exploiting or using the work,
since the third party becomes the owner for all purposes. Consequently,
assignments of the work their entirety merely in order to allow a third party to
bring suit are likely to be somewhat rare, and occur in situations where either
the original copyright holder obtains a large enough payout from the third
party that renders it willing to avoid dealing in the work altogether, or the third
party is willing to acquire the copyright seeing its potential to commence
lawsuits against future defendants as well.
Third parties that acquire the copyright with the sole objective of
litigating infringement claims or licensing its use to others, resemble nonperforming entities or “patent trolls” in the area of patent law.128 The
probabilistic and prospect-like nature of the patent right encourages this model
in relation to patents.129 Copyright’s entitlement on the other hand, being tied
to the specific expression in question, allows for such prospecting to a much
lesser extent, which is likely to result in this approach to third party
involvement being somewhat rare.130
5. Fair Use Insurance
The previous mechanisms all described ways by which third parties
may come to be involved in copyright infringement litigation on the plaintiff’s
side. Yet, as discussed earlier, third party litigation funding can come to benefit
defendants as well.131 The principal way in which this is likely to come about
is through a mechanism best described as fair use insurance—where the third
party underwrites the defendant’s likelihood of succeeding in its defense of fair
use when an infringement claim is brought.
Situations could thus arise where a defendant being sued for copyright
infringement raises a colorable defense of fair use. If a sufficiently robust fee
shifting regime were put in place, the beginnings of which are already
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contained in current law,132 third parties are likely to be willing to underwrite
the defense by pricing the risk associated with its success (and factoring in
their own expertise in litigating the claim) and then potentially bringing the
defense themselves. If the premium offered by the third party for such
underwriting is significantly lower than the settlement offer from the plaintiff
(which is in turn likely to be lower than the amount demanded at trial),
defendants—especially those whose existence depends on their continued
reliance on the fair use doctrine—are likely to obtain such insurance. In due
course, we are also likely to see variations in the coverage offered by third
parties, correlating to the amount of control they assume over the litigation and
settlement processes. Here, we might thus see a variety of arrangements
materializing, which track some of the options just discussed on the plaintiff’s
side. The third party may simply fund the defendant’s case, or instead might
choose to take the lead in defending the claim and deciding on litigation
strategy. What distinguishes these policies from traditional liability insurance
is the fact that they are obtained by defendants after the litigation (or the threat
of litigation) actually materializes, and not necessarily in advance.
B. Obstacles
Having a market for copyright claims take shape will however require
more than just an attitudinal shift among participants in the copyright system,
requiring them to see litigation as a necessary and integral part of the system
and its functioning. It will additionally require overcoming a host of legal
obstacles that in turn have their source in the common law, in the statutory
language of the Copyright Act, and in judicial interpretations of the same. This
Section explores the primary legal obstacles that a market for copyright claims
is likely to face and suggests possible remedial fixes. This Section discusses
two somewhat independent sets of obstacles: (i) those originating in the
common law, and (ii) those internal to copyright law.
1. Common Law Obstacles
The first set of obstacles is likely to originate in a set of principles and
doctrines that have long been known to the common law since time
immemorial. On the face of things, it may seem as though copyright is immune
from these principles given its statutory origins. Yet, courts routinely invoke
the interpretive principle of “common law conformity” while interpreting the
Copyright Act, which mandates that the statute be interpreted in line with
132

17 U.S.C. §505 (2005) (allowing “reasonable attorney’s fees” to be awarded to the prevailing party);
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 501 U.S. 517 (1994) (holding the successful defendants were entitled to invoke
§505 as well).

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS

33

existing common law ideas and doctrine whenever possible. Should courts
come to extend this idea in relation to transactions relating to copyright claims,
these obstacles are likely to become real.
a. The Non-assignability of Claims
The alienability of actionable claims in the common law has for long
remained a controversial topic.133 Early in the development of the law, courts
invalidated all attempts to transfer such claims, worrying that it would result in
courts being overburdened with contentious lawsuits, brought by disruptive
third parties, i.e., strangers.134 Over time, the common law came to relax the
stringency with which the prohibition was applied and enforced.135 Purely
personal claims were still placed under the restriction, whereas non-personal
ones came to be understood as alienable.136 Since non-personal claims survived
the death of the original plaintiff, while personal ones were terminated (under
the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona), alienability came to be tied
to the survivability of the claim.137 And paradigmatic of non-personal claims
were indeed property claims, such as those relating to trespass and
conversion.138 Two reasons seem to suggest that the historic common law rule
of non-assignability is unlikely to be invoked in relation to copyright claims.
The first reason is conceptual. Given its exclusive rights framework,
copyright law is often thought of in terms of a property interest rather than as a
purely personal claim. Copyright claims are thus paradigmatic of the kinds of
claims that the common law itself came to allow assignments of in due course.
Thus, even under the old rule, copyright claims are unlikely to be seen as nonassignable.
The second reason originates in the Supreme Court’s more recent
approach to the common law rule, especially as it applies to federal statutory
claims. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC
Services considered whether the common law’s general approach to nonassignability ought to be extended to more recent statutory regimes created by
Congress—and concluded against applying the rule.139 In Sprint, the Court was
133

For early work documenting the history of this development see: Walter Wheeler Cook, The
Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1916); William S. Holdsworth, The History of
the Treatment of Chose in Action By the Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1920).
134
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note __, at *442. See, e.g., Lampet’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (K.B. 1612)
(forbidding the assignment of a “thing in action” to a stranger); Holdsworth, supra note __, at 1006-9.
135
J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 214 (1913). Commercial considerations are believed to have
been responsible for these changes.
136
See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 74-75 (2011); W.W. Allen,
Assignability of Claim in Tort for Damage to Personal Property, 57 A.L.R. 2d 603 (1958).
137
Sebok, supra note __, at 75.
138
3 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1275 (1905); id. at 76.
139
554 U.S. 269 (2008).

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS

34

presented with the question of whether the assignee of a bare right to
commence a legal claim for money, based on a provision of the
Communications Act of 1934, had standing to commence the action.140 The
original entitlement to sue was entirely statutory in origin, and a practice had
emerged wherein third party enforces accumulated the claims of multiple
parties and then through an assignment commenced actions for recovery
(against the original defendants) in their own name.141 Despite the statutory
nature of the right to sue, a majority the Court considered the applicability of
the common law, but concluded that the common law itself had evolved and
come to permit the assignability of claims as a default position—even when
done so exclusively to bring suit. The majority thus found that the assignee had
standing to sue.142 Sprint can thus be seen as confirming two ideas at once: (i)
that the common law’s default position is no longer one of non-assignability,
and (ii) that this new default (i.e., of assignability) extends to federal statutes.
b. Champerty and Maintenance
In addition to its rules on non-assignability, the common law developed
specialized doctrines through which they policed (and continue to regulate) a
third party’s involvement in bringing an actionable claim to court. The
doctrines of “maintenance”, “champerty”, and “barratry,” serve this purpose.143
These rules do not apply to outright transfers. Maintenance entails assisting a
plaintiff in either bringing or defending a lawsuit when the person so providing
the assistance “has no bona fide interest in the case”.144 Champerty is a form of
maintenance, performed for consideration.145 Barratry is “adjudicative cheerleading” wherein one person encourages an action to be brought.146
State common law courts routinely use these doctrines to regulate
lawsuits brought by third parties.147 They usually scrutinize the individual
claim brought in court, to see if it is affected by the third party’s involvement.
They either focus on the type of action being brought, or on the relationship
between the original claimant and the investor.148 Some states for instance,
forbid the investor from “intermeddling” in the litigation,149 others forbid third
140

Id. at 271.
Id.
142
Id. at 289.
143
Id. at 94; Steinitz, supra note __, at 1289.
144
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009).
145
Id. at 262.
146
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.13, at 490 (1986).
147
For an excellent discussion of the connection between assignments and maintenance, see: Sebok,
supra note __, at 94-97.
148
Id. at 108-9.
149
Id. at 109-12.
141

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS

35

parties from getting involved in cases involving specific subject matter,150 and
yet others regulate it contextually, examining the plaintiff’s real motivations
for commencing the action.151
On the face of things, it may appear as though these doctrines are
unlikely to apply to copyright claims, given that they originate in state
common law, while copyright disputes are always questions of federal
statutory law. Yet, the fact of the matter is that even while copyright
infringement lawsuits are a question of federal law, agreements that govern the
conditions under which the lawsuit may be brought are matters of contract law
that must of necessity be governed by state law. Federal courts have in the past
used state common law during infringement disputes, and applied the doctrines
of champerty and maintenance to contractual arrangements. For example, in
Refac International, Inc. v. Lotus Developtment Corp.,152 a third party had
acquired a 5% stake in a patent “[t]o facilitate suit in [the third party’s] name
as plaintiff and to avoid the need for having [the original owner] named or
brought into the suit as a co-plaintiff.153” The court found this arrangement to
be champertous under New York state law, and invalidated the arrangement
during an infringement lawsuit.154
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance remain an obstacle for
third party involvement not just in copyright claims, but also other forms of
litigation. Despite their having been in existence for centuries now, courts and
scholars have struggled to find a coherent reason for their existence. Their
principal motivation appears to be the idea that litigation is something of an
evil that needs to avoided.155 As courts have come to recognize the absurdity of
this idea, so too have they come to relax the stringency with which the
doctrines of champerty and maintenance are applied.156 It is thus quite
conceivable that in the near future, a large number of states will come to
abandon the doctrines altogether, or at least limit their application to cases of
truly frivolous litigation.
2. Copyright Law Obstacles
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Even if the common law’s traditional rules against assignability, and its
doctrines of maintenance and champerty were rendered inapplicable to
copyright infringement claims, copyright law’s internal doctrines present a
host of additional (and direct) obstacles to the realization of a market for
copyright claims. Three in particular stand out: (i) copyright law’s rule against
the assignment of the right to sue—affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, (ii)
copyright’s requirement of formalities for statutory damages, and (iii) the
reluctance with which courts award defendants costs and attorney’s fees in
unsuccessful infringement actions.
a. The Non-Assignability of Infringement Claims
Quite independent of the common law’s rules on assignment, some
courts have interpreted the Copyright Act as precluding assignments of the
“bare” right to sue, independent of assignments involving the underlying
copyright itself. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Silvers v. Sony
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. crystallized this position.157 Silvers involved a
plaintiff who had produced a copyrighted work under the work-for-hire
doctrine, under which ownership of all rights vested with her employer.158 On
learning that the defendant was possibly infringing the work in question and
realizing that her employer (i.e., the copyright owner) was unwilling to
commence the action, she approached her employer and obtained an
assignment of “all right, title and interest in and to claims and causes of action
against” the named defendant and other possible infringers of the work in
question.159
Hearing the matter en banc, the Ninth Circuit found the assignment to
be invalid. The court offered four reasons for its conclusion. First, it noted that
the copyright statute vested the right to commence an infringement action only
with the “legal or beneficial owner” of the work, which it had in turn
circumscribed through a narrowly tailored definition.160 Second, it looked to
the legislative history of the Act to conclude that Congress had intended the list
of assignable rights to be exhaustive, and enumerated in the Act itself.161
Congress’s failure to list the right to sue, in other words, implied its nonassignability. Third, it looked to patent law, copyright’s cousin, to find that in
patent law too, courts had historically disallowed similar assignments of the
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mere right to sue.162 Fourth and lastly, it looked to precedent from other
circuits that had similarly disapproved of such transfers.163
The court’s overall reasoning in reaching its conclusion remains deeply
problematic. In creating a set of enumerated rights and treating them as
independently assignable, Congress was doing little more than attempting to
simulate the basic structure of a property right. It was in the process saying
very little about the enforceability of those enumerated rights, for which it
needed to create an independent provision in the Copyright Act. Merely
because the Act specifies the mechanisms by which copyright’s exclusive
rights may be transferred or assigned need not imply that it forbade other forms
of assignments. The simple point is that assignments of claims (even copyright
claims) are technically not actual transfers of copyright, and therefore outside
the scope of the statute to begin with. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sprint,
discussed earlier, makes this fairly clear.164 In Sprint, the Court rightly relied
on the common law’s allowance for the assignability of claims—even when
done so exclusively to bring suit—to find that the assignee had standing to
sue.165 The mere fact that the statute in question—the Communications Act in
that instance—was silent on the point, presented the Court with no problem on
this issue. In light of this, the Ninth Circuit’s belief that a statutory scheme
somehow had to be self-contained in all respects seems rather myopic.
The Court’s other reasons remain equally flawed. Copyright and patent
law derive from fundamentally different theoretical and structural rationales,
which ought to have cautioned against the ready use of comparisons between
the two. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has cautioned against over-reliance
on the analogy between the two regimes.166 In choosing precedent to follow
from other circuits, the Ninth Circuit could have easily chosen a more
permissive precedent to follow instead of the one that it finally did. The Court
was in the end likely motivated by the same policy concerns that have
historically informed the common law’s rules against the assignment of claims,
even though it masked these concerns in its formalist rhetoric.167
Other circuits seem to adopt a different position. The Fifth Circuit, for
instance, has adopted the position that assignments of copyright claims are
perfectly valid, present no problems under public policy and indeed that such
assignments comply with the the “real party in interest” rule.168 While this
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position was framed under the 1909 Act, there seems little reason to believe
that the 1976 Act changed it in any way or form. The Second Circuit’s position
on the other hand remains somewhat unclear. While the majority in Silvers
thought that the Second Circuit disallowed assignments of the bare right to
sue,169 the dissent in that case parsed the Second Circuit’s opinions on the
matter to come to the exact opposite conclusion and find that the Second
Circuit in fact permitted just such an assignment and found it to confer
standing on an assignee plaintiff.170 In short, the law seems fairly unclear on
the permissibility of such assignments under copyright law, which in itself
forms a major obstacle.
Facilitating a market for copyright claims will of necessity require
adopting a clear rule that permits assignments of the right to sue. Given the
Supreme Court’s position in Sprint and the flawed reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Silvers, there seems little reason to believe that this will be hard to
realize. Indeed, no circuit court has revisited the issue since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sprint, which seems to implicitly override the interpretive
logic of Silvers and its progeny. Were the issue to surface again, the logic and
holding of Sprint is likely to force courts to validate such assignments, barring
a misplaced argument that copyright law merits differential treatment.
b. Formalities for Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Central to facilitating the involvement of third parties in copyright
litigation is a robust damages regime—and copyright’s provision for statutory
damages can ideally perform that role. As noted earlier, the entry of third
parties can form a bridge between plaintiffs who would have otherwise been
unable to access statutory damages, and such damages.171 Additionally, a rule
allowing courts to award a successful plaintiff its attorney’s fees (a version of
the English rule on fee-shifting) provides third parties with a further incentive
to fund copyright plaintiffs. Yet, under current law, the availability of both
statutory damages and attorney’s fees depends entirely on actions undertaken
by the copyright owner well in advance of the litigation, or indeed the third
party’s entry into the picture. §412 of the Copyright Act renders the
availability of these remedies (for a published work) contingent on the
copyright owner having registered the work within three months from the first
publication of the work, when the infringement commences before such
publication and registration.172 In effect, the copyright owner needs to register
the work prior to the commencement of the infringement, for statutory
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damages and attorney’s fees to remain available.173 The legislative history
accompanying this provision indicates that it was introduced in order to
“induce” adherence to copyright’s formalities, once they were rendered
optional.174 The idea was to prevent recourse to copyright’s special remedies in
situations where the infringement had occurred prior to registration; and the
three month duration was intended to operate as “grace period”.175
§412 is likely to reduce—rather drastically—a third party’s willingness
to be involved in copyright litigation, since a large majority of copyright
owners are unlikely to register their works prior to first publication or even
shortly thereafter. This provision is also in contrast to §411, which mandates
that the work be registered prior to the commencement of the infringement
action, but not necessarily before the infringement itself began.176
In an ideal world, the stringency of §412 would be relaxed, and it
would come to operate along the lines of §411—requiring registration prior to
commencing the lawsuit and not earlier. Alternatively, the “grace period”
might be extended, especially given the periodic term extensions that copyright
law has seen over the years,177 which seem to rely on the assumption that
creative works hold value for longer and longer periods of time. Yet,
legislative modification of §412 is highly unlikely, especially given the
extensive misuse of copyright’s statutory damages in recent times.178 The net
effect of the provision and the possibility of third party funding is therefore
likely to translate into authors (i.e., creators) who worry about high litigation
costs and about being unable to litigate an infringement suit on their own,
choosing to register their works voluntarily merely in order to preserve the
option of enticing third party funders to acquire their claims in due course. In
the short term then, §412 will serve to deter the entry of third parties into
copyright litigation, in the medium term however it is likely to induce a greater
number of creators to register their works hoping to entice third parties. As the
involvement of third parties grows, and copyright owners are able to anticipate
the kinds of claims that the market best responds to, §412 is likely to produce
an equilibrium where works most suited to third party funding come to be
registered.
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c. Defendants and Cost-Shifting
As discussed earlier, third party funding can come to benefit defendants
in copyright infringement lawsuits as well—by moving the risk of litigation
away from them through a mechanism of insurance. For this to work however,
third parties need a somewhat strong incentive to acquire such risk. In the
ordinary scheme of things, American law doesn’t allow courts to award a
successful party (plaintiff or defendant) the costs of the litigation, but instead
requires each side to bear its own costs.179 The copyright statute is however an
exception to this. §505 of the Act gives the court “discretion” to award the
recovery of “full costs” to a party and “reasonable attorney’s fees” to a
successful party in an infringement lawsuit.180 On the face of things, §505
draws no distinction between a plaintiff and defendant, as far as the court’s
exercise of its discretion goes.181 Yet, as a historical matter, several courts
tended to make such awards to plaintiffs rather than defendants and even
adopted rules to this effect, which came to be known as the “dual approach”.182
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, the Supreme Court clarified that successful
defendants were to be treated no differently from successful plaintiffs as far as
awards of attorney’s fees goes.183 Since it based its conclusions on the structure
and basis for the provision as a whole (i.e., §505), there is no reason to believe
that its logic doesn’t extend beyond attorney’s fees, to a court’s award of “full
costs” under the same provision. Central to the Court’s conclusion was the
recognition that defendants too needed to be given an incentive to defend
themselves.184 It thus explicitly noted that “defendants who seek to advance a
variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them
to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims
of infringement.185” Encouraging defendants to contest the claim through
litigation, rather than settling, was thus central to the Court—something that
third party funding will stimulate.
Despite the Court’s holding in Fogerty however, as a practical matter
defendants rarely ever succeed in being awarded costs and attorney’s fees,
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even when they are successful.186 The reason for this originates in the Court’s
own reasoning. In order to preserve lower courts’ discretion on when to make
such awards, the Court identified the use of factors such as “frivolousness,
motivation, objective unreasonableness” and the ideals of “compensation and
deterrence”.187 As a result of this observation, courts in most jurisdictions
remain unwilling to award defendants attorney’s fees unless convinced of the
plaintiff’s blameworthiness or culpability in bringing the suit to begin with.188
As long as a plaintiff has a reasonable copyright claim, such culpability is in
turn extremely hard to establish—and is usually associated with “bad faith
motivation”, “hard-ball tactics”, or “objective unreasonableness”.189 The net
effect is thus that both Fogerty and §505’s limited move away from the
traditional American rule have meant very little to defendants in practice. This
is in turn likely to put a major dampener on the role that third party funding
can play for defendants.
Overcoming this obstacle is entirely up to courts—and requires treating
the fair use defense as something that the plaintiff ought to factor into its
decision whether to bring the infringement suit to begin with. Some courts
already take this position and remain willing to find fault with the plaintiffs
when the defendant has a valid fair use defense.190 They thus treat a plaintiff’s
insistence on pursuing a claim when the defendant has a valid fair use defense,
as objectively unreasonable and potentially frivolous.191 To be sure, not all
courts take this position, and indeed some view a defendant’s risk-taking (by
copying) as necessitating that it bear its own costs and expenses.192 A welcome
change would thus be a uniform rule that treats a defendant’s colorable fair use
defense—when ascertainable in advance—as a basis for invoking §505 and
requiring the plaintiff to bear the defendant’s litigation costs. In some ways,
this approach derives support from the very structure of the copyright owner’s
(i.e., the plaintiff’s) basic entitlement, under which the set of exclusive rights is
“subject to” the fair use defense (among other exceptions), to begin with.193
Some scholars have used this language to suggest that the plaintiff ought to
bear the burden of establishing that the defendant’s use isn’t a fair use to begin
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with.194 At the very least though, the plaintiff ought to bear the risk of
incurring the other side’s litigation costs, even if not the actual burden of
establishing the absence of fair use.195
CONCLUSION
The copyright system is today in a state of deep crisis. In its current
form, it seems to be imposing enormous costs on society, with its limited
benefits flowing to a small minority of creators and users. And yet, attempts to
reform the system remain largely unwilling to think creatively to bring about
fundamental change. In specific, the possibility that solutions to some of the
system’s problems can come from the market, rather than from doctrinal
reform, remains largely unexplored. In this Essay, I have argued that
facilitating a regulated market for copyright infringement claims, where third
parties can acquire or invest in, infringement or fair use claims in court, might
make the system more egalitarian, less inefficient, and likely to thereby serve
its goals of inducing creativity. Accepting this, of course, requires recognizing
that litigation isn’t an unavoidable reality of the copyright system, but rather a
central analytical and functional part of how it works, something that scholars
and courts have thus far resisted.
Once litigation is seen as part of the solution rather than as part of the
problem, harnessing the resources and expertise of third parties can come to
bring to it, can become a powerful source of reform for the system. To be sure,
claim markets aren’t likely to solve all of copyright’s problems, many of which
will indeed require doctrinal changes. At the very least though, it will
recognize such markets to form a legitimate part of the conversation about
copyright reform.
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